Humanities

In this essay, I reconstruct tolerance as a moral virtue, by critically analysing its definition, circumstances, justification and limits. I argues that, despite its paradoxical appearance, tolerance qualifies as a virtue, by means of a restriction of its proper object to differences that are chosen. Since this excludes the most important and divisive differences of contemporary pluralism from the scope of the virtue of tolerance, the moral model of toleration cannot constitute the micro-foundation of the corresponding political practice. However, if the political ideal of toleration must be founded on independent political reasons of justice, the moral model can bridge the gap between private morality and public reason, providing citizens with moral motives to supplement the political obligation to neutrality.

... ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI ... Within the theories of justice which have been proposed after Rawls's, the pluralist theory by Michael Walzer was the first to stress membership in the distributive unit as a special social good, namely, as the precondition for being considered in ...

... In our case, circumcision was requested by adult women, who supposedly wanted it for their own good, no matter if harmful. ... On forced marriage in Great Britain see: A. Phillips and M. Dustin, “UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and Exit,”Political Studies 52 ...

... Instead of confronting my argument and showing where my reasoning is faulty and how my interpretation does not grasp the sense of the issue ... But, for some reason, it often happens that those who advocate the end of objectivity and truth most loudly are also the most intolerant ...

The focus of this paper is the discussion between supporters of the intentional account of SD and supporters of the causal account. Between these two options the author argues that SD is the unintentional outcome of intentional steps taken by the agent.  More precisely, she argues that SD is a complex mixture of things that we do and that happen to us; the outcome is however unintended by the subject, though it fulfills some of his practical, though short-term, goals. In her account, SD is produced after a fashion similar to those beneficial social phenomena which serve some collective purposes, are the product of human action, but not of human design, such as money, language and many social conventions; and similarly SD can be accounted by invisible hand explanation. The paper will critically analyze both the intentional and the causal accounts, and then present the invisible hand explanation which avoids the most puzzling aspect of the intentional view, while keeping the distinctiveness of SD in the realm of motivated irrationality. A brief discussion of the issue of responsibility for SD will conclude the paper.

The paper deals with the explantion of the two types of Self-Deception, the straight type, when the deceptive belief corresponds to the subject's desire, and the twisted type, when the deceptive belief runs opposite the subject's wish. The intent is to propose a unitary explanation of both, yet different from the one proposed by the causal model.

... ANNA ELISABETTA GALEOTTI University of Torino ... of the Conseil d'Etat, which, in November 1989, formally took issue on the matter, ruling that French students had ... in the school with their Islamic veil, the legal decision in favor of tolerance looked more like a de facto compro ...